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Mr. Feldstein: I’d like to add one thought of my own about China.
As Rakesh Mohan indicated, China is really in quite a different posi-
tion demographically from the others, as we heard yesterday. It is also
true in terms of its interest in reform of social security. I have been
very interested in those reforms. They are fascinating in themselves
and important, more generally. It is also interesting as a response to
some of my American friends who think that the move toward a
funded system is some kind of a conservative right-wing conspiracy
to tell them that it was the Chinese Communist Party that got there
ahead of us. The Chinese have on paper a two-part system with a pay-
as-you-go part and a larger funded part. Right now they are
implementing that. Despite a number of problems, they are imple-
menting that in several of the major regions. It is a very interesting
experiment for us to follow.
Mr. Fraga: I am struck with Don Johnston’s remarks. I have tried
that myself while I was in government, and it is not easy. I have a
couple of things to report and a couple more creative comments. 
One, it seems very difficult to get these things done under demo-
cratic conditions for some reason. Of course I am not against
democracy, please don’t get me wrong. But we should study—do a
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359breakdown—of successful reforms and see who did what and under
what circumstances and to see how those who managed to succeed
under democracy found a way to do so.
In Brazil, in 1998, we voted a constitutional amendment that
now requires actuarial balance in our social security. That was a big
thing. It was done under enormous pressure. And, of course, now
we need to vote the laws that will implement that, which may take
a couple decades. 
Another reform done in Brazil, which is creative and interesting, is
that for the nongovernment social security system, there is now a link
between the age of retirement and the table of mortality. As the age
expectancy grows, the retirement age will grow automatically. I
thought that was a good thing to do. I do not know if that has been
done elsewhere.
On the more creative side of things, one idea would perhaps be to
start discussing this not with the kind of people who listen to us
current and former central bankers but rather than with kids in
school. My guess is we need to start fostering a culture of savings in
secondary school. 
Lastly, of course, we all like fully funded systems, but we haven’t
seen them mature yet. I think we should throw a word of caution out
there for the market risks involved and the resulting disparities in
retirement levels across people and over time. You can do your
numbers with stock market returns and bond returns over a few
decades to see that. I wonder what the political consequences will be
as you find these great disparities. There will be huge political pres-
sures for the government to equalize and provide a retirement floor.
It’s not too early for us to start thinking about these issues.
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mistake to throw too much garbage at pay-as-you-go systems. The
exact consumptions/loan model of Samuelson, which Jim Poterba
so elegantly described in his remarks, shows that under those
assumptions there is a net increase in social benefit from a pay-as-
you-go system. 
In Singapore, where we have a fully funded public pension system,
they have to invest a substantial fraction of their provident fund in
external assets. If they invested it all at home, they would push the
domestic capital stock beyond the golden rule, and that does not
make much sense. If we talk about public pension systems that have
net liabilities of 200, 300, 400 percent of GDP, to add that much to
the capital stock by making them fully funded would not make in
most countries a great deal of sense in most countries. What is impor-
tant, in most of our countries where capital is below The Golden
Rule, is that at the margin the system should be fully funded.
Even more important, and this is a point that came out in the
remarks and was not sufficiently emphasized, the marginal incentives
for perspective pension recipients need to be gotten right. That is the
most important thing to do about our pension systems—to make
sure that those who are willing to contribute more, or have more
contributed in their behalf, get higher benefits and those who
contribute less get proportionately less benefits. Those who work
longer before they begin to collect get proportionately more benefits.
Those who work shorter periods get fewer benefits. That is the way
in which we get the incentives for private behavior in terms of work
as well as investment to not be enormously and disastrously distorted
by the pension problem. That is the key reform that needs to be kept
in mind in virtually every country.
Mr. Rajan: There has been a fair amount of pessimism expressed
about specific solutions being the single solution that would solve the
problem. Immigration has been mentioned more than once. Rightly
so, because we did an exercise at the IMF for the forthcoming World
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be needed to keep the working-age population to total population
constant until 2050 in developed countries. When you look at
increasing labor force participation, you need an increase of about 11
percent for this group, which is considerable. For Japan, it requires
an increase in the participation rate over and above 100 percent. So,
that clearly will not work. 
If you look at immigration, it requires cumulative immigration of
30 percent as a fraction of population by 2050 in those countries.
Again, Japan is way out of the ballpark. 
If you look at increasing the retirement age, it is about seven years
on average for these countries. Again, if you look at Japan, it takes
you beyond life expectancy if you want increasing the retirement age
to be the solution. 
But if you take a combination of these three, it turns out to be far
more attractive. An increase in participation of 33⁄4 percent, an
increase in immigration of 10 percent over 50 years, and an increase
in retirement at an age of 2.3 years, all of which seem completely
plausible but would be reasonable solutions. I just wanted to throw
that on the table.
Mr. Meltzer: I want to make an obvious point, which has not been
fully put out in front. That is to consider the political economy of
this problem. There is a clear and obvious direction of change in
economic solutions even though we may not agree precisely on the
details of the distribution, as we heard a moment ago. The difficult
and intractable political problem is getting to any one of these
economic solutions when we have governments that are elected for
four to five years and are asked to solve a problem, which has to be
resolved over 20 years or more. 
Second, we have a rising percentage of the older voters coming into
the labor force so that the people who are going to be deprived or
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larger numbers. That problem is going to increase as time goes on, as
we have heard. 
Third, we have the attitude of their children, who in many cases
believe that if the government is not going to provide these pensions,
that some of that burden is going to fall on them. So, they support
the system as well. 
Finally, we have the very modest proposals for reform that we see
coming out of governments. That is tremendous effort to get to
modest changes in the existing system without really trying to deal
with the long-term structural problem that we see here. So, missing
from the discussion is how we get from the political problem that is
so clearly at the root of this problem to an economic solution. That
seems to be something that has been totally ignored. Yet, that is the
crux of the problem. The economic solutions, some mixture of immi-
gration, longer work life, and so on are pretty obvious, and they are
clear to everyone who examines this problem. Yet, no country seems
to be of a mind to do anything about it. The politics are really what
has been missing from the discussion.
Mr. Liikanen: I have two comments. First, when the baby boomers
have retired, they will have a qualified majority. That is a real
problem. So, if we want to run, we have about five to eight years to
make reform. After that, the qualified majority is always in the hands
of retired people. That explains also one issue. You can do reforms,
which have an impact on the longer term. But if you must cut the
direct benefits now, you have a real difficulty.
Secondly, I have a question for Mr. Corbo, who had an elegant
presentation on the reforms in Chile in Latin America. You
mentioned that private funds are running the system, but then in
your paper you say there are many limits on their rights to invest. Of
course, that has an impact on the rate of return on investment. Could
you give some more insight regarding that? What kind of return on
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for instance, and so forth?
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell:The OECD has played a crucial role in iden-
tifying the aging problem, and the IMF is monitoring the progress.
But the remaining biggest challenge is really to raise the public aware-
ness. It does not make sense to create fear and to threaten the people
because this creates pessimism about the future, and we can see the
restrictive consumer behavior, for instance, in some European coun-
tries. Therefore, building up some confidence that the problem can
be addressed is crucial as well.
Mr. Schoenholtz: Throughout this conference, there have been
some references to the rising cost of health care and the relationship
to aging. Yet, most of the quantitative work and the discussions have
focused on pension costs and resolving them. It might be appropriate
to ask Don Johnston if he would like to comment on OECD policy
recommendations about dealing with future health costs. In the
United States, for example, there have been a variety of estimates that
suggest that the Medicare shortfalls are four to five times the size of
that of Social Security. 
Mr. Corbo: First, regarding the question that one can also work
with the pay-as-you-go system, in emerging markets the pay-as-you-
go system has been abused. In Chile you had close to 120 different
schemes, where the most powerful groups got the most benefits. The
strongest trade unions were able to get the best schemes. So, there
were a lot of intragenerational retributions. The old system was
completely abused. That is why we had the enormous deficit and so
on. It proved very difficult to try to instill more fairness in the old
system. That would have helped the incentive, but this was not some-
thing one could do. Assets were already being taken away. 
Allen Meltzer has an important argument from the standpoint of
how one can create an incentive system in such a way that progress
can be made. Here, one should consider initiative aimed at improv-
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of the new system. So, the speed of reforms will have to be tailored to
the political economy that it will have to be brought in. 
The last question inquired about investment returns and restric-
tions. In the case of Chile, the average annual real rate of return in the
system since its introduction in 1982 until today is 10.4 percent.
That is not just because of the system; it is because of how the
economy has been doing thanks to the massive reforms that
unleashed a period of high and sustainable growth. As progress has
been made and as resources have been accumulated—now, as I said,
the system has accumulated resources close to 60 percent of GDP—
so the restriction on investment has been lifted. The second part of
the question was the proportion of pension assets can be invested
abroad. Today, in the Chilean system you can invest out of the
country 30 percent of the accumulated fund. In most of the other
countries in the region, it is the same question. In Bolivia, because of
the small size of the domestic capital market, they can invest abroad
up to 50 percent of the accumulated fund. The most-restrictive one
is in El Salvador, where, because of political pressure, pension funds
cannot be invested outside the country. Therein lies a cost on risk
diversification and so on. 
Mr. Johnston:The comment on Brazil and its law that was adopted
to establish an actuarial balance of the social security system might be
an easier thing to politic on than to say we are going to cut back your
pension fund. Probably the way to approach it is to have framework
conditions, if you could get them in place, that would automatically
adjust. On the retirement age growing, I was thinking where we
would all be today if that had been adopted by Bismarck at age 65.
Alan Greenspan was mentioning that the other day; if you extrapo-
late that, all of us would be very, very active in the workforce and so
would our parents. It is an interesting position.
The point that Meltzer made is absolutely fundamental. How do
you move from a political problem to an economic solution? We have
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more with some than others. Our experience is of great value to
China, Korea, and India because they can see that in a robust democ-
racy, it is easy to give and it is very hard to take away for all the reasons
that Meltzer described. I do not think I have an answer to that yet,
but that is what we have to struggle for. 
On the issue of health, it is interesting you raised that. I did not
spend much time on health in this paper because the health costs vary
from country to country, depending on the policies. The OECD just
completed a major three-year study on comparative health systems.
We are going to continue those studies because the best practices are
so critical when you look across all our countries and find that all the
systems have problems. Some are very efficient but are spiraling out
of control. Some are unduly expensive and not delivering. It goes
right down through the whole health delivery system—private,
public, mixture of public/private, pension, the issue of pharmaceuti-
cal costing, and the issue of alternative treatments that might be
available or not be made available. We delivered this to the ministers
in May when we had a health ministers’ gathering. 
We were invited to continue with this work, which is incredibly
important because it is the fastest-growing area of public expenditure
in all our countries. Whereas we are talking about the pension issue
here, it is really the Medicare issue that is the bigger problem in the
United States, looking down the road. That is not true of all coun-
tries, but nearly every country within and without the OECD is
concerned about rising health costs. 
Mr. Feldstein: When you talk about Medicare, there are really two
problems. One is the cost of actually delivering the product, whatever
that product should be. And the other problem is the financing. The
financing is very much analogous to the pension financing. So, to the
extent that prefunding in an investment-based system is a good idea
for accumulating resources for other kinds—nonhealth consumption
in old age—why is it not a good idea for the financing of health care
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the health care spending. 
Mr. Mohan: I endorse what Raghuram Rajan said about migration,
but more from the sending side. In India, for example, we are now
receiving something like 3 to 4 percent of GDP in terms of remit-
tances. Those are basically family-based remittances that do not seem
to vary very much for the interest rates or stock markets, etc. There
were some comments made yesterday that if too much migration
takes place, the sending country will suffer. Our experience shows
that is not correct. In fact, the sending country also gains first from
the remittances themselves and a lot of that goes into the care of the
elderly in terms of the parents and, second, the on-the-job training
that migrants get and many of whom then come back. 
Second, I also wanted to comment on the political issue ventured
by Allan Meltzer that despite the fact that in our case, in India the
percentage of the elderly is very large. In terms of political weight,
they seemed to increase much more in recent years. We have created
most of the investment of the provident fund, etc., which is really
funding the fiscal deficit in government securities. There has been a
huge debate in the last few years in terms of interest rates that has
actually caused us a lot of difficulty in monetary policy because they
are set much higher than market interest rates, and people forecast
nominal interest rates rather than real interest rates. 
Third, regarding the health issue I previously mentioned, I want to
again underline that what we are observing is that with the rise in
technology, many less well-off families and middle-income families
are going bankrupt because of very high medical costs. That is an
issue that we will have to tackle along the lines previously mentioned.
Finally, I want to again emphasize that a good part of whatever
provision exists for provident funds and so on, is invested in govern-
ment securities that for this whole fully funded privately funded
system to work—whether it is for health insurance, whether it is for
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essential. One cannot say enough about that. What I forgot to
mention as I was preparing for this paper is that I found a mountain
of work that NBER has done on all of these issues. I wish that it
would extend its wings to Asia and get all that work done in Asia
because there is a huge lack of knowledge about these issues there.
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